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 1 
Two Concepts of Agreement1 
Christian List 
 
A central problem of democracy is the aggregation of divergent individual inputs into overall collective 
decisions. Social-choice-theoretic impossibility results famously demonstrate the intractability of a large class of 
such aggregation problems. This paper develops a taxonomy of two concepts of agreement, agreement at a 
substantive level and agreement at a meta-level, and discusses the escape-routes these concepts open up from the 
impossibility problems of social choice. Specifically, two contexts of democratic aggregation are addressed: 
first, the familiar context of preferences, and second, the largely unexplored context of sets of judgments over 
multiple interconnected propositions. Drawing on some recent developments in social choice theory and 
democratic theory, I will defend the view that, when agreement is conceptualized in democratic theory and when 
it is sought in democratic practice, more emphasis should be placed on agreement at a meta-level than is 
commonly done. Finally, I will address the more general question to what extent it is acceptable for the stability 
of institutions for democratic aggregation to be dependent on specific empirical contingencies. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A great challenge for democracy is the resolution of conflict between divergent individual 
preferences, views or interests. Sometimes it is held that democracy is about finding "the will 
of the people", but if the "wills" of different individuals bear little resemblance to each other, 
it may be hard to extract anything from the set of individual "wills" that can plausibly be 
considered "the will of the people". 
 
Condorcet's famous paradox captures some of these problems. If there are three individuals, 
where one prefers option x to option y to option z, the second prefers option y to option z to 
option x, and the third prefers option z to option x to option y, then there exist a majority for x 
against y, a majority for y against z, and a majority for z against x. This means that, if pairwise 
majority voting is the method for aggregating individual preferences into collective ones, or 
more grandly, for extracting "the will of the people", then the resulting collective preferences 
can be cyclical and thus useless for reaching consistent collective outcomes. 
 
More generally, Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem (1951/1963) shows that, if the 
domain of admissible individual preference input is unrestricted (the universal domain 
condition), there exists no procedure for aggregating individual preferences in this domain 
into collective ones in accordance with a set of arguably undemanding minimal conditions 
(the weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship and 
transitivity of social orderings) -- conditions capturing the requirement, in a nutshell, that 
collective preferences be both minimally reponsive to individual preferences and consistent.  
 
The difficulties posed by aggregation depend crucially on how divergent the preferences, 
views or interests of individuals are. In the (rare) limiting case of unanimity the difficulties 
obviously disappear. If everybody had exactly the same preferences, views or interests, there 
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would be no conflict to resolve. But while unanimity is sufficient for the disappearance of the 
famous Condorcet and Arrow aggregation problems, it is not necessary. Since Duncan Black's 
seminal work (1948), it is well known that Condorcet's paradox can be traced back to a 'lack 
of structure' in the relevant set, also called profile, of individual preferences across 
individuals. Black himself proved that single-peakedness, a structure condition to be 
discussed more formally below, (jointly with the (harmless) technical condition that the 
number of individuals is odd) is a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the 
avoidance of Condorcet paradoxes. A well-known corollary of Black’s insight is that Arrow's 
impossibility result ceases to hold if the domain of admissible individual preference input is 
restricted to profiles of preferences satisfying single-peakedness.  
 
At one level, Black's result seems only to confirm what we already think we know, namely 
that, if the disagreement between different preferences, views or interests stays within certain 
limits -- limits that are somehow transcended in situations like the one of the Condorcet 
paradox --, then familiar methods of democratic decision making, like pairwise majority 
voting, are available for reaching collective outcomes in reasonably defensible and logically 
consistent ways. But Black's result teaches us much more than that. It highlights an important 
distinction between two different concepts of agreement. The two concepts are what we might 
call agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level. It is this distinction that 
the present paper will explore. The paper discusses two contexts of democratic aggregation: 
first, the context of preferences, and second, the context of sets of judgments over multiple 
interconnected propositions. Sections 2 and 3 explore the two concepts of agreement in the 
first context, section 4 introduces the less familiar context of sets of judgments over multiple 
interconnected propositions, and sections 5 and 6 explore the two concepts of agreement in 
this second context. In particular, drawing on some recent developments in social choice 
theory and democratic theory, I will defend the view that, when agreement is conceptualized 
in democratic theory and when it is sought in democratic practice, more emphasis should be 
placed on the concept of agreement at a meta-level than is commonly done. Section 7, finally, 
takes a step back and addresses the question to what extent it is acceptable for the stability of 
institutions for democratic aggregation to be dependent on specific empirical contingencies. 
 
2. Agreement at a Substantive Level and Unanimity 
 
Two or more individuals agree at a substantive level to the extent that their preferences or 
views are the same. Perfect agreement at a substantive level is the case of identical 
preferences or views across different people.  
 
In response to the problems of democratic aggregation, it is natural to argue that processes of 
political deliberation should be encouraged with the aim of somehow reducing the level of 
conflict between different people's preferences or views and bringing about greater agreement 
at a substantive level. In his account of the idea of deliberative democracy, Jon Elster 
summarizes this view quite succinctly: "The core of the theory [of deliberative democracy] … 
is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up 
with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation. The input to the social 
choice mechanism would then not be the raw, quite possibly selfish or irrational, preferences 
…, but informed and other-regarding preferences. Or rather, there would not be any need for 
an aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous 
preferences." (Elster, 1986,  p. 112)  
 
If successful, the view outlined by Elster may seem attractive. There are, however, at least 
two problems with this view. The first, and practical, problem is that the idea that democratic 
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deliberation would produce unanimity may be unrealistic in many circumstances. People may 
agree on all relevant facts, and arguments, concerning different political options, and yet 
disagree on their most preferred option. They may agree on what the environmental effects of 
a new industrial development would be, and yet disagree on whether these effects should be 
accorded more weight than the expected economic benefits of the new development. In a 
recent empirical study, Cass Sunstein showed that deliberation, especially if it takes place in 
clustered homogeneous groups whose members reinforce each other's views, can sometimes 
even lead to polarization of opinion across different such groups rather than convergence 
(Sunstein, 2000). Although none of this is to deny the benefits of agreement at a substantive 
level -- if it can be reached --, it should be clear that democracy needs to have alternative 
resources for dealing with conflicts of preferences or views in those (plausible and potentially 
numerous) cases in which deliberation fails to produce unanimity.  
 
The second, and somewhat more theoretical, problem with the view outlined by Elster is that 
it is unclear whether convergence towards agreement at a substantive level (falling short of 
perfect unanimity) is the most promising strategy for avoiding Condorcet and Arrow 
aggregation problems. William Gehrlein devised social-choice-theoretic measures of social 
homogeneity capturing basically the question of how closely a given profile of preferences 
across individuals approximates agreement at a substantive level. Using these measures, he 
showed that, although there is a positive connection between the level of social homogeneity 
and the avoidance of Condorcet problems, the connection is much weaker than what one 
might have hoped to find (Gehrlein, 2000). 
 
3. Agreement at a Meta-Level and Single-Peakedness 
 
Black's insight is to ask not whether two or more individuals have the same preferences over a 
set of options, but rather whether there exists an ordering of these options from 'left'-most to 
'right'-most such that each individual has a most preferred position on that 'left'/'right' 
dimension and prefers options less and less as these options get more and more distant from 
his or her most preferred position. If there exists a 'left'/'right' ordering of the options with this 
property, called a structuring dimension, then we say that the given profile of preferences 
across individuals satisfies single-peakedness.  
 
The terms 'left'/'right' are used here in a purely 'geometrical' sense. Any ordering of the 
options along which individual preferences are systematically aligned in the requisite way 
could serve as a structuring dimension, whether it orders the options from most urban to most 
rural, from most secular to most religious, from most architecturally avant-garde to most 
architecturally conservative, or in any other, however esoteric, way.  
 
Black's concept inspires the following definition. Two or more individuals agree at a meta-
level to the extent that they agree on a common dimension in terms of which an issue is to be 
conceptualized. They may reach perfect agreement at a meta-level while at the same time 
disagreeing substantively on what the most preferred position on that dimension is. 
 
Single-peakedness may thus be an implication of agreement at a meta-level. If the individuals 
agree on a common structuring dimension along which each individual's preferences are 
systematically aligned in the requisite way, then the profile of preference orderings across 
these individuals satisfies single-peakedness. However, since single-peakedness is only a 
formal structure condition on a profile of preference orderings across individuals, single-
peakedness is logically less demanding than agreement at a meta-level. The latter is sufficient, 
but not necessary, for the former. A profile of preference orderings across individuals may 
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happen to have the right formal structure for satisfying single-peakedness without the 
individuals semantically conceptualizing the issue in terms of the same common dimension. 
 
Further, single-peakedness is not merely a consistency condition on individual preferences. 
Take the preference ordering of a single individual (over a finite set of options). Unless we 
make reference to a specific structuring dimension, the question of whether this preference 
ordering is single-peaked is vacuous or, to be precise, must vacuously be answered in the 
affirmative. For we can simply define this individual's most preferred option to be the 'left'-
most option, his or her least preferred option to be the 'right'-most option, positioning 
intermediate options from 'left' to 'right' in a decreasing order of preference (supposing the 
preference ordering is strict). With respect to this artificially constructed structuring 
dimension, the given individual's preference ordering is clearly -- but of course 
uninformatively -- single-peaked. The concept of single-peakedness becomes non-vacuous 
only when applied to the preferences of multiple individuals, for it is in those cases that we 
can ask whether or not different individuals' preferences are systematically aligned along the 
same common structuring dimension. This is the sense in which single-peakedness truly 
captures a formal implication of agreement, albeit at a meta-level. 
 
Now Black proved the following surprisingly simple, and yet ingenious result. Given a profile 
of preferences across individuals that satisfies single-peakedness, order the individuals (let us 
assume for simplicity that there is an odd number of them) from 'left'-most to 'right'-most in 
terms of their most preferred position (their 'peak') on the corresponding structuring 
dimension. With respect to this 'left'/'right' ordering of the individuals, the median individual 
is simply the one who has as many individuals to the left as he or she has to the right. Then 
the most preferred option of the median individual will beat, or at least tie with, all other 
options in pairwise majority voting. A simple corollary of this result is that, if the domain of 
admissible individual preference input consists only of profiles of preference orderings 
satisfying single-peakedness, then pairwise majority voting is a procedure for generating 
collective preferences in accordance with Arrow's minimal conditions of responsiveness and 
consistency. Moreover, studies by Niemi (1969) as well as Tullock and Campbell (1970) have 
shown that consistent social preferences, in accordance with these minimal conditions, are 
likely to exist if only 75% or even fewer of the individuals have preferences that are 
systematically aligned along the same common structuring dimension.  
 
Black's result suggests an alternative response to the challenge of democratic aggregation. 
Rather than seeking convergence towards agreement at a substantive level, which may be 
hard to achieve, we might seek convergence towards agreement at a meta-level. A recent 
strand of deliberative democratic thinking advocates precisely this idea (see Miller, 1992, and 
Dryzek and List, 2000). The idea is that the key to a deliberative democratic response to 
Condorcet and Arrow lies not in the idea of deliberation-induced agreement at a substantive 
level, but rather in the idea of deliberation-induced agreement at a meta-level. As the 
proponents of this idea emphasize, it is much more realistic, if nonetheless still demanding, to 
expect processes of political deliberation to produce agreement on what the relevant questions 
are rather than on what the answers should be.  
 
Specifically, the idea can be stated as a three-part hypothesis: 
 
(1) that group deliberation leads people to identify a single shared issue-dimension in 
terms of which the issue at stake is to be conceptualized; 
(2) that, for a given issue-dimension, group deliberation leads people to agree on the 
position of each (policy) option on that dimension; and 
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(3) that, once an issue-dimension has been identified as relevant, group deliberation leads 
each individual to determine a most preferred position (his or her 'peak') on that 
dimension, with decreasing (dimension-specific) preference as options are increasingly 
distant from that most preferred position. 
 
Neither part of the hypothesis is trivial, and since each part raises difficult social-
psychological issues, I am not able to address these questions properly here. To give an 
intuitive illustration of the issues at stake, suppose in over-simplified terms that (i) the 
question of what issue-dimension is relevant to a given democratic decision problem is a 
normative question, (ii) the question of where options are located on a given issue-dimension 
is (often or at least sometimes) a factual question, and (iii) the question of what structure 
dimension-specific preferences of an individual should take is a question of rationality. Under 
this supposition, the success of part 2 depends on whether group deliberation can bring about 
agreement on factual matters, for instance by clarifying and supplying information; and the 
success of part 3 depends on whether group deliberation can induce greater rationality in 
individuals. While both of these requirements are not undemanding, they are clearly not 
completely implausible. The success of part 1, on the other hand, depends on whether group 
deliberation can bring about agreement on normative matters, a much more demanding 
requirement in many cases. The combination of parts 1, 2 and 3 is, in essence, the hypothesis 
that group deliberation can bring about agreement at a meta-level, which then surfaces in the 
form of single-peakedness. 
 
In some cases, an appeal to public reasons and generalizable interests, characteristic of the 
kind of group deliberation deliberative democrats advocate, may lead to the identification of a 
single publicly relevant issue-dimension, and in consequence to agreement at a meta-level, the 
implication of which might be single-peakedness. But in other cases even the invocation of 
public reasons and generalizable interests may not have this effect, because individuals might 
still disagree about what is in the public interest, or whether, for instance, ecological integrity 
or economic growth should be given priority when such interests are in conflict. 
 
Even rational choice theorists of a more traditional orientation are likely to agree that parts 2 
and 3 of the hypothesis are relatively undemanding, and that the demanding and difficult part 
of the hypothesis is part 1. Mueller (1989, pp. 89-90), for example, argues, "[g]iven that we 
have a single-dimensional issue, single-peakedness does not seem to be that strong an 
assumption. What is implausible is the assumption that the issue space is one dimensional".  
 
Obviously, the question of whether the hypothesis that deliberation induces single-peakedness 
is empirically adequate cannot be answered by pure theorizing. List, McLean, Fishkin and 
Luskin (2000) have used data from Fishkin and Luskin's deliberative polls (on this method, 
see Fishkin, 1997, and a Symposium in PEGS, 9 (2), 1999) to test the hypothesis empirically. 
They studied a set of deliberative polls on topics of energy provision in Texas as well as a 
recent poll on the future of the monarchy in Australia. In these polls, participants were first 
confidentially interviewed on their opinions, then invited to participate in a weekend of 
intense group deliberation, and finally confidentially interviewed again, being asked exactly 
the same questions as in the pre-deliberation interviews. The study showed that the post-
deliberation levels of single-peakedness were either strictly greater than the corresponding 
pre-deliberation levels (in every Texan poll in the set) or at least on a par with them (in the 
Australian poll). 
 
Of course, these findings are not the final word on the introduced hypothesis. There may be 
situations that a favourable to its success, such as situations in which people, on reflection, 
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agree that a certain single issue-dimension (for instance, an ecological one) is particularly 
salient and should guide their conceptualization of the decision problem. But there may also 
exist situations less favourable to its success, such as situations in which a decision problem is 
perceived to be so inherently multidimensional, or in which people's value priorities on 
different issue-dimensions are so fundamentally different, that they neither agree on what the 
correct answer is, nor even on how to look at the problem.  
 
4. From Preferences to Sets of Judgements 
 
The discussion so far has been centred around the problem of aggregating individual 
preferences over a set of options into corresponding collective ones. Often, however, 
democratic decision making bodies are faced with the need to aggregate individual sets of 
judgements over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones. 
This need arises when complex policy systems or institutional structures are to be designed or 
chosen, where the various parts of a policy system or institutional structure constrain each 
other and consistency is of great importance.  
 
A simple example will serve to illustrate the problem. Suppose the following three policy 
proposals are simultaneously under discussion:  
 
P :  to introduce a special tax on gasoline (in order to provide an incentive to reduce the 
amount of 'unnecessary' driving and thereby to reduce the level of pollution); 
Q :  to abolish a subsidized commuter railway system; 
R :  to give special tax benefits to commuters (in order to compensate for their commuting 
expenses). 
 
Suppose further that everyone accepts that proposal R should be accepted if and only if both 
proposal P and proposal Q are accepted -- formally, (R ↔ (P ∧ Q)) --, for the following 
reason: If the special gasoline tax is introduced (P) and the subsidized commuter railway 
system abolished (Q), then society will impose an exceptionally great financial burden on 
commuters, so that commuters should be entitled to some compensation (R). On the other 
hand, if the special tax on gasoline is not introduced, or if the subsidized commuter railway 
system remains in service, then nobody needs compensation. 
 
For simplicity, let there be three individuals in the relevant decision making body, with the 
following sets of judgments on the three proposals (P, Q, R) and on the proposition describing 
their logical interconnection ( (R ↔ (P ∧ Q)) ). 
 
 individual 1 individual 2 individual 3 
P yes yes no 
Q yes no yes 
R yes no no 
(R ↔ (P & Q)) yes yes yes 
Table 1 
 
Note that each of the three individuals holds a perfectly consistent set of judgments in light of 
the proposition that R should be accepted if and only if P and Q are both accepted. Now if the 
individuals choose to determine their collective set of judgments on the basis of majority 
voting on each proposition, then they will accept both P and Q (each by majorities of 2 out of 
3), as well as (R ↔ (P & Q)) (the latter proposition unanimously), but reject R (by a majority 
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of 2 out of 3). But this is an inconsistency, given the unanimous agreement that the 
acceptance of both P and Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for the acceptance of R.  
 
In short, propositionwise majority voting over a set of logically connected propositions can 
lead to inconsistent collective sets of judgements, even when all individuals hold perfectly 
consistent sets of judgements. This problem is a version of what is sometimes called the 
doctrinal paradox (see, for example, Kornhauser, 1992, Chapman, 1998, Pettit, 2001, and 
Brennan, 2000). 
 
Generalizing this insight, List and Pettit (2001) have shown that, if the domain of admissible 
individual sets of judgements is unrestricted (so long as these individual sets of judgements 
satisfy basic consistency criteria) (the universal domain condition), there exists no procedure 
for aggregating individual sets of judgements in this domain into collective ones in 
accordance with a set of minimal conditions similar in spirit to those proposed by Arrow 
(anonymity, systematicity; and completeness, consistency and deductive closure of collective 
sets of judgments) -- conditions capturing the requirement that collective sets of judgements 
be both minimally reponsive to individual ones and consistent.  
 
Once again, the difficulties posed by this result depend on how divergent the sets of 
judgements held by different individuals are. I will now show that the two different concepts 
of agreement we have identified in the context of preferences can also be identified in the 
context of sets of judgements and that they here, too, point towards two different responses to 
the problem of aggregation. I will also argue that John Rawls's idea of an overlapping 
consensus (Rawls, 1993) can be seen as a special case of the concept of agreement at a 
substantive level and that it thus differs from the concept of agreement at a meta-level. 
 
5. Agreement at a Substantive Level and Overlapping Consensus 
 
Perfect agreement at a substantive level in the context of sets of judgements is the case of 
identical sets of judgements across different people. As before, one might try to solve 
problems of aggregation in the context of sets of judgements by encouraging processes of 
deliberation with the aim of bringing about greater agreement at a substantive level. We have 
noted in the context of preferences that agreement at a substantive level is a rather demanding 
condition that may be hard to attain in practice. Now, if we are dealing not with preferences 
over individual options, but with sets of judgements over an entire set of logically connected 
propositions, agreement at a substantive level may be even harder to attain. 
 
But there is one special case of the concept of agreement at a substantive level that may seem 
somewhat more realistic, if still demanding. This special case is a version of John Rawls's 
concept of an overlapping consensus. Often the sets of judgments on fundamental moral and 
political issues held by different individuals are mutually incompatible, in so far as these sets 
of judgments represent genuinely different comprehensive views of morality, including 
different supporting reasons even for those judgments the individuals agree on (like "killing 
human beings is bad"). However, in a less fundamental and more pragmatic realm of issues, 
there may actually be much more agreement. Given someone's overall set of moral and 
political judgments, this overall set will contain some judgments that the individual considers 
fundamental, maybe even 'axiomatic', and others that he or she considers less fundamental, 
maybe more pragmatic and applied. Now it is perfectly possible that the different (possibly 
mutually inconsistent) fundamental judgments held by different individuals may nonetheless 
have certain implications in common at a less fundamental level. This is logically possible 
because, if there is a relation of logical entailment between someone's fundamental and his or 
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her less fundamental judgments, this relation is usually a one-way relation. The more 
fundamental judgments may be logically sufficient to determine the less fundamental ones, 
but not logically necessary. The former ones may logically entail the latter, but not the other 
way round. The less fundamental and more applied judgments are usually logically 
insufficient to tell us what the underlying more fundamental judgments are. For instance, 
consider how many different fundamental reasons might be adduced to support certain 
welfare provision arrangements. One might believe in certain values of socio-economic 
justice and equality for liberal reasons or, alternatively, for religious reasons. Or one might 
believe that the main objective of the state is to keep the streets safe, to prevent crime and to 
ensure social stability, and that welfare provision arrangements are the only way to achieve 
this. Or consider how many different fundamental reasons one might have for wanting to 
implement specific policies for protecting the environment. One might believe in certain 
rights of future generations; or one might believe that non-human animals have rights that 
ought to be respected, or that ecosystems have intrinsic value. Or one might believe that 
environmental disasters would ruin the economy and that the only way to secure a successful 
economy in the long term would be to implement environmental policies. Many other 
examples could be given. An overlapping consensus requires the identification of a certain set 
of policy propositions (usually a proper subset of the set of those propositions that would 
make up an entire comprehensive view of morality) such that, with respect to these 
propositions, it is feasible to reach agreement at a substantive level, even if different 
individuals endorse the same judgments for different underlying reasons.  
 
It is an open question whether, and in what circumstances, processes of political deliberation 
can bring about an overlapping consensus that is sufficiently broad to give rise to a non-trivial 
collective set of judgments. In this brief discussion, however, two points should have become 
clear. First, an overlapping consensus in the sense of agreement at a substantive level over a 
restricted set of propositions is a less demanding condition than agreement at a substantive 
level over all propositions. Second, the concept of an overlapping consensus is different from 
the concept of agreement at a meta-level. In an overlapping consensus, the individuals agree 
on certain judgments, without necessarily agreeing on the supporting reasons for these 
judgments. They agree on certain answers, without necessarily agreeing on what the more 
fundamental issues or questions are. In a sense, they agree at a substantive level, albeit with 
respect to a restricted realm of issues, without necessarily agreeing on any meta-theoretical 
foundations for their substantive agreement. 
 
6. Agreement at a Meta-Level and Unidimensional Alignment 
 
Agreement at a meta-level is defined as agreement on a common dimension in terms of which 
an issue is to be conceptualized. In the context of preferences, I have argued that the structure 
condition of single-peakedness may be seen as an implication of agreement at a meta-level, in 
the sense that if the individuals agree on a common structuring dimension along which each 
individual's preferences are systematically aligned in the requisite way, then the profile of 
preference orderings across these individuals satisfies single-peakedness.  
 
While Black's concept of single-peakedness is not straightforwardly applicable to the context 
of sets of judgments, we we will now see that an alternative structure condition can be devised 
for the lattter context (List, 2001), and further that the new structure condition, like single-
peakedness, can be seen as an implication of agreement at a meta-level.  
 
In analogy to the context of preferences, the question is not whether two or more individuals 
hold the same sets of judgements, but this time it is whether there exists a single ordering of 
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the individuals from 'left'-most to 'right'-most such that, for every proposition in the relevant 
domain of issues, the individuals accepting that proposition are either all to the left, or all the 
right, of those rejecting it. If there exists a 'left'/'right' ordering of the individuals with this 
property, once again called a structuring dimension, then we say that the given profile of sets 
of judgements across individuals satisfies unidimensional aligment. It is easily seen that the 
judgements in table 1 above violate unidimensional alignment. No matter how the individuals 
are reordered from 'left' to 'right', it is impossible to get the required pattern of acceptance and 
rejection. By contrast, the judgements of the five individuals in table 2 below satisfy 
unidimensional alignment: there exists a single 'left'/'right' ordering of the five individuals 
(namely: 3, 2, 5, 4, 1) with respect to which, for every proposition, the individuals accepting 
the proposition are all to the left (they could also be all to the right) of those rejecting it. 
 
 individual 3 individual 2 individual 5 individual 4 individual 1 
P yes no no no no 
Q yes yes yes no no 
R yes no no no no 
(R ↔ (P & Q)) yes yes yes yes no 
Table 2 
 
Now, given a profile of sets of judgements across individuals that satisfies unidimensional 
alignment, order the individuals (again assume for simplicity that there is an odd number of 
them) on a structuring dimension. Then the set of judgements of the median individual with 
respect to the structuring dimension will be accepted in propositionwise majority voting (in 
the case of table 2, the judgements of individual 5). And provided that the set of judgements 
of each individual, most importantly the median individual, satisfies the relevant consistency 
criteria, so will the collective set. A corollary of this result is that, if the domain of admissible 
profiles of sets of judgements across individuals consists only of those profiles satisfying 
unidimensional alignment, then propositionwise majority voting is a procedure for generating 
collective sets of judgements in accordance with the minimal conditions of responsiveness 
and consistency used in the impossibility theorem by List and Pettit (2001). 
 
The claim that unidimensional alignment is an implication of agreement at a meta-level may 
seem less straightforward than the analogous claim in the case of single-peakedness, but here 
is a way of making it plausible. Suppose, firstly, that there is a single common issue-
dimension in terms of which all the propositions are conceptualized by the individuals, and 
suppose that each individual takes a certain position on that dimension. For simplicity, we 
will call it a 'left'/'right' dimension, but a range of interpretations is possible. And suppose, 
secondly, that, for each proposition, the extreme positions on the 'left'/'right' dimension 
correspond to either clear acceptance or clear rejection of this proposition and there exists an 
'acceptance threshold' on the dimension (possibly different for different propositions) such 
that all the individuals to the left of the threshold accept the proposition and all the individuals 
to its right reject it (or vice-versa). If these two conditions are met, then we have a situation of 
unidimensional alignment. As in the case of single-peakedness, unidimensional alignment 
requires no agreement at a substantive level: in the case described by table 4, for example, 
individual 3 and individual 1 disagree about every proposition. Unidimensional alignment 
requires only the existence of a common 'left'/'right' ordering of the individuals that 
systematically structures their pattern of acceptance and rejection over the various 
propositions.  
 
Once again, the claim is only that unidimensional alignment may be an implication of 
agreement at a meta-level, not that unidimensional alignment is by itself sufficient for 
 10
agreement at a meta-level. A profile of sets of judgments across individuals may happen to 
have the right formal structure for satisfying unidimensional alignment without the 
individuals semantically conceptualizing all propositions in terms of the same common issue-
dimension. 
 
Moreover, like single-peakedness, unidimensional alignment is not merely a consistency 
condition on individual sets of judgments. The singleton profile, consisting only of the set of 
judgments of a single individual, always trivially -- but of course uninformatively -- satisfies 
unidimensional alignment. Like the concept of single-peakedness, the concept of 
unidimensional alignment becomes non-vacuous only when applied to the sets of judgments 
of multiple individuals. In this sense unidimensional alignment captures a formal implication 
of agreement, albeit again at a meta-level. 
 
Unlike in the case of single-peakedness, no empirical research has been done on whether 
group deliberation can induce unidimensional alignment, or indeed on whether there are ever 
plausible real-world situations of sufficiently realistic complexity in which a profile of sets of 
judgments across individuals satisfies unidimensional alignment. But the mere observation 
that agreement at a substantive level may be hard, if not impossible, to attain in cases of 
complex and controversial issues and that unidimensional alignment is at least less demanding 
than full agreement at a substantive level should lead us to take the concept of unidimensional 
alignment seriously. 
 
7. Empirical Contingencies and Institutional Design 
 
A critic might be unconvinced by the claim that agreement at a meta-level and corresponding 
structure conditions such as single-peakedness or unidimensional alignment open up attractive 
escape-routes from the paradoxes and impossibility results of aggregation. Specifically, the 
critic might argue as follows. He or she would concede that, if empirical circumstances are 
such that individual preferences or sets of judgments satisfy the identified structure conditions 
(or approximate them to a sufficient degree), then aggregation procedures like pairwise 
majority voting or propositionwise majority voting will generate consistent collective 
outcomes. But, as soon as empirical circumstances are different, the very same aggregation 
procedures will fail to generate consistent collective outcomes. Social choice theorists can 
even make precise predictions about when such collective inconsistencies will occur. In other 
words, what we know about these aggregation procedures is that they work satisfactorily in 
some empirical circumstances (e.g. for certain profiles of individual preferences or sets of 
judgments) but not in others. The impossibility theorems further tell us that this problem is 
not just an artefact of pairwise or propositionwise majority voting, but that it is more general. 
It cannot be resolved by any aggregation procedure, except at the expense of some seemingly 
attractive minimal conditions. One would not like to design a house just on the basis of the 
observation that there are some empirical circumstances in which the house would be stable, 
while there are others in which the house would collapse. Rather, one would seek to design a 
house on the basis of solid physical calculations confirming its stability. Analogously, the 
critic argues, it is a risky ad hoc response to the problems of democratic aggregation to use 
aggregation procedures like pairwise or propositionwise majority voting and to rely on the 
observation that there are empirical circumstances -- like situations of agreement at a meta-
level -- in which these procedures work satisfactorily, while deemphasizing the existence of 
other circumstances in which they fail to do so. Like a house, procedures for democratic 
aggregation should be designed so as to work satisfactorily in all relevant circumstances (e.g. 
for all logically possible profiles of individual preferences or sets of judgments). They should 
not have to rely on the hope that certain empirical circumstances rather than others obtain. 
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They should be guaranteed to generate consistent collective outcomes, no matter what the 
empirical circumstances are. So far the critic's objection. 
 
The general question this objection highlights is the following. Should political institutions, 
such as aggregation procedures, be designed in such a way as to work robustly under all 
possible empirical circumstances (at least within a relevant domain of circumstances), or is it 
acceptable for such institutions to rely on specific empirical contingencies that are exogenous 
to, and not guaranteed by, them? 
 
At first sight, the critic's objection clearly has some force. After all, institutions that rely on 
specific empirical contingencies may seem prone to erratic behaviour, just as the house whose 
stability can be guaranteed only under specific empirical circumstances may seem a 
dangerous structure. However, on closer inspection, the objection loses some of its force. 
Even the most well designed house, designed on the basis of solid physical calculations, will 
collapse under some circumstances, for example if there is a sufficiently strong earthquake. 
Strictly speaking, it is therefore not true that a well designed house will be stable in all 
circumstances. The critic might respond that building standards take that problem into account 
too. In earthquake zones like California, unlike in Britain, houses are required to meet 
particular building standards to withstand earthquakes. But, if an exceptionally strong 
earthquake were to occur, even a house built in accordance with those rigorous standards 
might collapse. 
 
The observation that can be made from these points is this. Whenever something is to be 
designed, whether it is a house or an institution, there is a domain of possible circumstances 
the house or the institution may be confronted with. In some of these circumstances (call them 
type 1) the house or the institution may have perfect stability, while in others (call them type 
2) the house may collapse or the institution may fail to work satisfactorily. Rather than 
requiring the design of a house or institution for which there are no circumstances of type 2, 
which may be difficult if not impossible, a reasonable strategy would be the following. First 
consider the probability distribution over the relevant domain of circumstances, and then ask 
whether the probability of circumstances of type 2 is sufficiently low (if still nonzero) for the 
risk of instability under those circumstances to be bearable. For example, even in Britain the 
probability of the occurrence of a massive earthquake is presumably nonzero. But as this 
probability is low, it is considered acceptable for houses in Britain not to be built to withstand 
massive earthquakes. In California, the probability distribution is different, and building 
standards are adjusted accordingly. Generally, if stability across all possible circumstances is 
difficult or impossible, the design of a house or an institution would have to be adjusted to the 
probability distribution over the relevant domain of circumstances. The idea would be to 
design a house or an institution in such a way that the probability of corresponding 
circumstances of type 1 is high and the probability of corresponding circumstances of type 2 
is low. 
 
If discursive conditions in a group of individuals are such that (a sufficient degree of) 
agreement at a meta-level and corresponding structure conditions are extremely probable, 
while the occurrence of profiles of preferences or sets of judgments leading to collective 
inconsistencies is extremely improbable, then the use of aggregation procedures like pairwise 
or propositionwise majority voting seems as defensible as the construction of houses in 
Britain which do not meet Californian building standards (under arguably undemanding 
assumptions about the probability distribution over profiles of preferences, it can be shown 
that the probability of collective inconsistencies decreases towards 0 as the number of 
individuals increases; see the appendix on the probability of cycles in List and Goodin, 2001). 
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If discursive conditions are different, on the other hand, then the use of such aggregation 
procedures is much less defensible. The defensibility of an aggregation procedure may thus be 
sensitive to the relevant probability distribution over the set of all logically possible profiles 
of preferences or sets of judgments. This probability distribution will itself depend on certain 
empirical facts about the relevant context and the relevant group of individuals. Moreover, 
additional institutions, like deliberation settings prior to the use of an aggregation procedure, 
might be designed with the aim of transforming that probability distribution so as to reduce 
the probability of circumstances of type 2. The defensibility of the suggested aggregation 
procedures, then, is no longer an a priori matter (as typically viewed by classical social choice 
theorists), but dependent on certain empirical contingencies, which might differ from context 
to context. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The distinction between agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level was 
motivated by Black's response to Condorcet and Arrow. And, as we have seen in the context 
of preferences, the context of Black's own work, there are both theoretical and empirical 
results in support of the view that the 'meta-agreement' strategy -- the idea that a democracy 
should seek agreement at a meta-level through processes of political deliberation -- is a 
promising response to the challenge of resolving conflict between divergent individual 
preferences, given appropriate empirical circumstances.  
 
In the context of sets of judgements over multiple interconnected propositions, on the other 
hand, our conclusions must remain much more tentative. Again, the two concepts of 
agreement can be identified, and their logical status, even in terms of avoiding impossibility 
problems of aggregation, is very similar to that of their more well known counterparts in the 
context of preferences. To determine whether a 'meta-agreement' strategy is practically 
available in this new context, however, remains an open question for democratic theory and a 
challenge for democratic practice.  
 
In short, many important questions remain open. Most importantly, we will need to tackle the 
question of whether a certain 'base level of cohesion' -- for instance, in the form of (partial) 
single-peakedness or (partial) unidimensional alignment -- is absolutely necessary for any 
strategy of democratic conflict resolution to be successful, or whether democratic conflict 
resolution mechanisms can be made so robust as to cope with even the most extreme limiting 
cases of divergence. The impossibility theorems of social choice would certainly seem to 
apply in the latter cases. 
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